Should a person suffering from insane delusions be able to use (the defense of) self-defence against imaginary threats? by Webb, Michael James, 1979-
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
W367 
2001 
REC~,v~o AUG 3 1 2001 
MICHAEL WEBB 
LLB (HONS) RESEARCH PAPER 
SHOULD A PERSON SUFFERING FROM 
INSANE DELUSIONS BE ABLE TO USE (THE 
DEFENCE OF) SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST 
IMAGINARY THREATS? 
LAW FACULTY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
2001 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON 
Te Whare Wananga 
o te Upoko o te Ika a Mau i 
-~· 
LIBRARY 
' --._ 
-
hi 
---- I 
----._ 
-
Ill 
-
:: 
------- I 
---
lq ._ 
Ill 
I CONTENTS 
Page 2: Introduction 
Page 3:The Background to Green: Self-defence and Insanity Under New Zealand Law 
Page 7:The Reasoning in Green 
Pagel8:Whether Green is a Good Decision from a Policy Perspective 
Page 23 :Reforming the Insanity/Self-defence Relationship 
Page 37:Conclusion 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSl'v dF WFI U~JGTON 
" -• -----
' ' • 
--• ----
II INTRODUCTION 
This essay will consider whether a defendant who kills someone whilst suffering 
from insane delusions should be able to use (the defence of) self-defence against 
imaginary threats. This issue has been highlighted by the decision in the case of R v 
Green. 1 
In this case the armed offenders' squad had been called to Green's residence 
because he had been behaving strangely with a sawn-off shotgun. One of the 
constables forced open the door, and was shot by Green. The evidence suggested 
that Green thought that he was acting in necessary self-defence because of a belief 
that the officers were KGB infiltrators seeking to kill him. However, he was 
deluded and no fewer than four psychiatrists agreed that he was legally insane at the 
time of the killing. On this basis, it was accepted that he would have a good defence 
of self-defence (which if successful would result in an unqualified acquittal), but 
• . 2 
not msamty . 
Arguably this result is undesirable (given that he was essentially insane) and the 
more appropriate result for Green and from a public policy perspective would have 
been for him to become a special patient (the likely result of an insanity verdict} 
In order to explore this idea this essay will, first canvass the background to this 
decision-the law relating to insanity and self-defence, including who raises it, plus 
comparison of disposition options. It will then analyse the decision of Green4 in 
more detail before considering whether the decision was right both in terms of the 
law (with respect to the wording of the provisions of the 1961 New Zealand Crimes 
Act) and policy. This will, in tum, enable the determination of whether anything 
should be done to prevent such a result from occurring in the future. 
1 R v Green [1993 J 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
2 R v Green, above, 524-525. 
3 Criminal Justice Act 1985, sll5 (1). 
4 R v Green, above. 
ill THE BACKGROUND TO GREEN: SELF-DEFENCE AND INSANITY 
UNDER NEW ZEALAND LAW 
In order to fully understand the processes which have resulted in the outcome 
illustrated by Green, 
5 
it is important to look closely at the defences of self-defence 
and insanity under New Zealand law. This is because (a) Green thought he was 
defending himself and (b) was probably insane. 
A History and Operation of Insanity Defence (includes Procedure and 
Disposition) 
The insanity defence in New Zealand has been developed from M'Naghten 's Case .6 
From this case, a number of rules were developed; the essential elements of which 
were first incorporated into New Zealand's criminal law in section 23 of the 
Criminal Code Act 18937 and subsequently section 43 of the 1908 Crimes Act. 
One of the questions posed by the judges in M 'Naughten 's Case concerned the 
liability of a person who commits an offence as a consequence of an insane 
delusion about existing facts 8 The answer to this question was incorporated into 
both the 1893 and 1908 Acts:9 
5 R v Green, above. 
6 
M'Naghten 's Case (1843) 8 ER 718 (HL). 
7 
The Criminal Code Act was itself based upon the Draft Code of the English Criminal Code Bill 
Commission, published in 1879 (This Code was drafted by Sir James Fitzjames Stevens) and indeed 
s23 of the 1893 Act enacted in almost identical terms the text of section 22 of the Draft Code, although 
the arrangement of the tex.1 differed in some respects: Simester and Brookbanks Principles of Criminal 
law (Brooker' s, Wellington, 1998) 267. 
8 
Simester and Brookbanks Principles of Criminal law (Brooker's, Wellington, 1998) 288. 9 
Crimes Act 1908, s 43(3). 
-
PI 
A person laboring under specific delusions, but in other respects sane shall not be acquitted on the 
ground of insanity under the provisions hereinafter contained unless the delusions caused him to 
believe in the existence of some state of things which, if it existed, would justify or excuse his act 
or omission. 
This limb (the "specific delusions" limb) of the insanity defence was removed in 
1961, when the Crimes Act was revised and section 23 became the new insanity 
provision. The material parts of section 23 are as follows: 
(2) No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of an act done or omitted by him when 
labouring under natural imbecility or disease of the mind to such an extent as to render him 
incapable: (a) Of understanding the nature and quality of the act or omission; or (b) Of knowing 
that the act or omission was morally wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards of 
right and wrong. 
The "specific delusions" provision was excluded from the 1961 Crimes Act 
because of a perception that it was redundant. This idea undoubtedly flowed from 
decisions such as Murdoch v British Israel World Federation (NZ) Inc, 10 which 
noted that a Green-like situation came within the "wrong" limb of the insanity 
defence. 11 
The issue of whether the conduct of a defendant comes within the ambit of section 
23 tends to be raised by the defence. The prosecution can't raise this issue. 12 
However, a judge utilising their powers under section 113 (3) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985 can, under certain circumstances, raise the issue of insanity. 13 This 
section stipulates that: 
Nothing in this section shall limit or affect the power of a judge to leave to the jury the question 
of whether the defendant was insane within the meaning of section 23 Crimes Act 1961. 
notwithstanding that the defendant has not pleaded insanity nor put the question of his or her 
sanity in issue, where it appears in evidence that the defendant may have been insane at the time 
of the commission of the offence. 
10 Murdoch v British Israel World Federation (NZ) Inc [1942] NZLR 600 (CA). 
11 Murdoch v British Israel World Federation (NZ) Inc, above, 649 Smith J. 
12R v Green (1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
13
The provision is a statutory clarification of R v Cottle (1958] NZLR 999 (CA) where, although sane 
automatism only had been pleaded, the jury acquitted on the ground of insanity: Simester and 
Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (Brooker's, Wellington, 1998) 294. 
If it is decided that a defendant comes within the ambit of section 23, the court has 
three disposition options (set out in section 115 Criminal Justice Act 1985): 
committal as a special patient; committal as a patient subject to a compulsory 
treatment order under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) 
Act 1992; and immediate relief However, it usually commits the person as a 
special patient, especially when the charges are serious. 
14 
B History of Self-defence 
The original test for self-defence in New Zealand required a reasonable belief 
However, this changed when section 48 was introduced into the Crimes Act in 
1981 . It provides: ''Everyone is justified in using, in the defence of himself or 
another, such force as, in the circumstances as he believes them to be, it is 
reasonable to use." 
The relevance (to the case at bar) of this historic change was that a person like 
Green would now come within the ambit of this defence. This is because he 
honestly (albeit whilst suffering from insane delusions) believed he was under 
attack. Under the old self-defence law, however, such a plea would fail-since an 
insane belief is, by definition, deemed unreasonable. 
C Post-Trial issues 
l If insanity verdict 
As mentioned in Part III (a) a person who is held to be insane at the time that he 
kills a victim invariably become a special patient under section 115 of the Criminal 
Justice Act. Special Patients may only be released, or transferred to patient status, 
on the direction of the Minister of Health. This political dimension is supposed to 
reflect the particular need to ensure the protection of the public in such cases. 
2 If acquitted of self-defence but still insane 
The procedure is quite different if the defendant were to receive an unqualified 
acquittal on the grounds of self-defence; notwithstanding that they were essentially 
insane (arguably the situation in R v Green.
15
) Such a defendant would, in all 
likelihood, be committed independently of the trial process. 
The procedure for such a committal would begin with an application [that complies 
with the formalities in section 8 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992] for a compulsory treatment order being made under section 
14( 4) of that Act. 
Such an application would then be probably heard by a Family Court judge (section 
17) who would also examine the patient ( section 18). If the Court considers that 
such an order is necessary (section 27(c)) it would then have to decide between 
which of the two options of inpatient or community treatment order would be best 
suited to the needs of the particular patient (section 28(2)). 
In a case with facts similar to those in Green, an inpatient order is most likely due, 
inter alia, to the severity of the act they committed and the consequential risk to 
society that they would otherwise create. An inpatient order requires continued 
detention in a specified hospital. A person so committed would generally be in a far 
better position to re-enter society than a "special patient." This is because such 
"ordinary" patients are under the control of the particular psychiatric institution, 
and can be released at the discretion of the superintendent. A defendant like Green 
would therefore have an incentive to plead self-defence and hope for an unqualified 
14 In cases involving homicide it has been held to be an "invariable" practice for judges to ma
ke a 
special patient order and that it is inappropriate to take any other course: See R v GH
 r1977] 1 NZLR 
50. 
acquittal, to avoid becoming a special patient (and therefore possibly have an easier 
route back into society). 
However, if the judge making such an inpatient order considers that the patient 
poses a danger to others (like Green clearly does), they can refer the case to the 
Director of Mental Health (under section 54.) If the Director agreed with the 
judge' s perspective, they could, apply to the Court for a restriction order (section 
55(3)). Such a patient would then become subject to the same sections with regard 
to leave as special patients, including patients in respect of whom an order has been 
made under section 115 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 .
16 
On the face of it, this seems to suggest that a person like Green may still effectively 
end up in the same position (regarding release) as someone who is held to be insane 
notwithstanding his or her unqualified acquittal. Therefore, the result in Green
17 
may be appropriate. However, as will be explained in greater detail in Part V of this 
essay, various negative policy outcomes would still flow, even if such a defendant 
were to become a restricted patient. 
Now that the background to the Green
18 decision has been canvassed, it is 
important to explore the decision in light of both the law and the policy outcomes, 
which the law is trying to achieve. 
IV THE REASONING IN GREEN 
A Why the Court of Appeal Concluded that the Case was Covered by Self-defence 
not Insanity 
The case of Green19 was first tried in the High Court, where the defendant pleaded 
not guilty. At a pre-trial conference, defence counsel indicated he would not be 
putting forward the defence of insanity and would not call psychiatric evidence. A 
15 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
16 Sylvia.A.Bell (ed) Mental Health Law in New Zealand (Brooker 's, Wellington, 1998) 65. 
17 R v Green, above. 
18 R v Green, above. 
19 R v Green, above 
preliminary psychiatric report obtained by defence counsel indicated that the 
accused was fit to plead, but suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. This was 
notwithstanding the fact that four psychiatrists had certified that Green was legally 
insane at the time of the alleged offences. The Crown, in response, indicated its 
intention to call psychiatric evidence to show that the proper verdict would be not 
guilty by reason of insanity. The judge allowed the Crown to adduce such evidence. 
On the basis of this evidence, the jury returned verdicts of not guilty by reason of 
insanity. This decision was reversed in the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the 
trial judge's decision to permit the Crown to adduce evidence of the insanity 
defence was erroneous in point of law. 20 The judge went further by saying that 
Green was not insane within section 23 of the Crimes Act 1961.21 
The Court of Appeal ' s conclusion essentially involved self-defence trumping 
insanity. This decision was based largely on two facts . First, all four [psychiatrists] 
said that Green had an honest and genuine belief that he was acting in necessary 
self-defence. 22 Secondly, this belief had a rational foundation in that it would have 
clearly been a good defence if it had been true. Consequently, this did not suggest 
any lack of moral understanding that to shoot someone is wrong, unless necessary 
for one' s own defence. There was also no evidence that Green was incapable of 
understanding the nature and quality of his act. Therefore, he did not come within 
the ambit of the insanity defence. 23 
20 R v Green, above, 513-514 McKay J. 
21 R v Green, above, 524-525 McKay J. 
22 Therefore by virtue of this honest belief he came within the ambit of the defence of self-defence: R v 
Green, above, 524-525 McKay J. 
23 R v Green, above, 524-525 McKay J. 
Implicit in this decision is the idea that not all cases in which a defendant commits a 
crime whilst suffering from specific delusions will come within the ambit of this 
limb of the insanity defence. Whether it does or not will depend on whether their 
act would have been morally justifiable if the facts as they believed them to be had 
been true.24 If such a justification existed, they were capable of knowing that the act 
was morally wrong. 
This approach suggests that the Green
25 case is a product of the fact that the 
morally wrong limb doesn't cover certain specific delusions such as those suffered 
by the defendant in that particular case.
26 Therefore, the cause of the problematic 
Green result was the law itself.27 (Not merely an unjustified interpretation of the 
law.)28 However, in order to support this argument, it is useful to look at case Jaw. 
B Comparison with Similar Cases in other Jurisdictions 
Green29 isn't the only case where the issue has arisen as to whether a person who 
kilJs someone based on a deluded belief ( caused by a disease of the mind) comes 
within the ambit of the insanity defence. Three other such cases are R v Chaulk;
30 
Walsh v The Queen;31 and R v Oommen.
32 It is useful to compare the facts of these 
cases to Green. Unlike Green, these cases all held that such a defendant came 
within the ambit of the "morally wrong" limb of the insanity defence. On the face 
of it, this suggests that the reasoning of Green may not be correct 
(unjustified/unduly narrow interpretation of New Zealand's insanity laws) given 
24 It is important to note, however, that if such an accused is acting as an automaton then he will come 
within the ambit of the morally wrong limb notwithstanding that his act would be morally justifiable if 
the facts as he believed them to be had been true: See Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme 
Court Tasmania-Court Criminal Appeal A 68/1993, 42 Crawford J. 
25 R v Green, above, 513. 
26 This idea is supported by case law such as R v Moke [1917] 3 W. W.R. 575 (Alta. S.C.) and R v Budic 
(No. 3) (1978) 43 CCC (2d) 419, which held that the "specific delusions" provision and the other 
limbs of the insanity defence provide alternative defences. 
27 This suggests that the specific delusions provision should be reinstated because it would have 
application independent of the other two limbs of insanity. 
2 
This analysis will be limited to the defence of insanity where judicial decision has diverged 
especially with respect to the ambit of the "morally wrong" limb. This can be compared with the self-
defence law, which clearly covers a Green like situation. 
29 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
30 R v Chaulk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC) 
31 
Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme Court Tasmania-Court Criminal Appeal A68/1993 . 
32 R v Oommen (1994) 91 CCC (3d) 8 (SCC). 
.. 
New Zealand legislation. However, although the outcomes in these cases are 
different, I will argue that they are each correct on their own facts/ given their 
legislative context. 
The case of Walsh
33 involved a defendant who killed the deceased whilst suffering 
from a dissociative flashback episode which made him believe he was back in the 
Korean War (he was a war veteran), and the deceased was an opposing soldier who 
was about to take his life. The verdict was not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Although this case involves similarities with the case of Green, 
34 in that they both 
involved a defendant (who had a disease of the mind) doing an act that would have 
been morally justifiable if the facts as they believed them to be had been correct, 
there was also a key difference which caused the different results. This difference 
was that the defendant in Walsh
35 was acting as an automaton
36 (his action was 
without conscious volition
37
) when he killed the deceased. In such a situation, a 
person who commits a crime clearly would not understand the nature and quality of 
their act38nor that their act was wrong. (This can be compared with the defendant in 
the case of Green
39 who clearly was in a conscious state of mind when he 
committed the act of murder). Therefore, the result in Walsh
40 (found insane under 
the "morally wrong" limb) is consistent with the result in the case of Green. 
4 1 
The result in Green
42 can also be distinguished from that in Chaulk
43 on the facts. 
The verdict in the latter case was one of insanity. The Chaulk 
44 case involved two 
teenagers who suffered from a paranoid psychosis. They believed that they could 
rule the world, and killing was a necessary means to that end. They knew that the 
laws of Canada existed, but believed that they were above the law and thus had the 
33 Walsh v The Queen, above. 
34 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
35 Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme Court Tasmania-Court Criminal Appeal A 68/ 199
3. 
36 The defendant in Walsh was acting as an automaton. This is illustrated by the fact that the 
psychiatrist in that case said that he suffered from post traumatic stress disorder, which trigger
ed him 
into a dissociative state. 1n this state the defendant would have acted as he did on an impulse which he 
would have been powerless to resist: Walsh v The Queen, above, 16 Crawford J. 
37 M urdoch v British Israel Federation p 942J NZLR 600, 605 (CA). 
38 See R v Cottle [ 1958] NZLR 999 (CA). 
39 R v Green [1993J 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
40 Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme Court Tasmania-Court Criminal Appeal A68/ 1993
. 
41 R v Green, above. 
42 R v Green, above. 
43 R v Chaulk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193. 
right to kill the victim because he was a "loser".
45 Therefore, they did not know that 
it was morally wrong to kill someone unless for example acting in self-defence (and 
therefore came within the "morally wrong" limb of the insanity defence) . They 
actually thought it was right to kill "a loser".
46 This can be compared with the 
defendant in the case of Green, 
47 who knew that it was wrong to commit murder in 
the applicable circumstances but was merely deluded about the actual 
circumstances. 
Arguably, however, the case of Green
48 cannot be distinguished from the case of 
Oommen49 on its facts. The verdict in the latter case was one of insanity (under the 
"morally wrong" limb of the insanity defence) . It involved a defendant who 
suffered from a paranoid delusion that the deceased had been commissioned (as 
part of a conspiracy) to kill him. This delusion convinced the defendant that he was 
obliged to kill her. 
Both cases involved a voluntary act (compare with Walsh
50
) by a defendant who 
acted under a deluded belief ( caused by a disease of the mind) in a set of facts, 
which, if true, would have made the act morally justifiable. The conclusion to be 
drawn from this (because both countries have the same "morally wrong" limb to the 
insanity defence51 ) is that these two cases involved different interpretations of the 
ambit of the "morally wrong" limb of the insanity defence. 
The reasoning in Oommen
52 was that the accused, unbeknownst to him, was killing 
in a circumstance in which it was morally wrong to do so. Consequently, he didn't 
44 R v Chaulk, above. 
45 R v Chaulk, above, 200. 
46 There are comparisons here with the case of R v Budic (No. 3) (1978), 43 CCC (2d) 419. In this case 
Budic, under the insane delusion that his doctor was part of a conspiracy to withhold medical treatment 
from him, killed him. A refusal to provide medical attention does not justify murder. It was held 
specifically that the " specific delusions" limb of the irlsanity defence did not cover such a fact pattern 
whereas the "morally wrong" limb did 
47 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
48 R v Green, above. 
49 R v Oommen (1994) 91 CCC (3d) 8 (SCC). 
50 Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme Court Tasmania-Court Crimirlal Appeal A68/1993. 
51 Although in the Canadian legislation they refer to "wrong", as opposed to " morally wrong" the Court 
in the case of R v Chaulk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193, 236 said that "wrong" meant " morally wrong" and 
not simply "legally wrong." (Therefore this difference in the wording in the insanity provisions of the 
respective jurisdictions had no bearing on the difference in the outcome of the two cases.) 
52 R v Oommen, above. 
know that he was in the wrong. In fact, the delusion caused him to believe that it 
was right to commit murder in his case.
53 On the basis of this reasoning, the judge 
concluded that delusions as to factual matters, which if true would make an act 
morally justifiable, could demonstrate that a person was incapable of knowing that 
an act was morally wrong.
54 The Court in Green
55 disagreed. They seemed to base 
their decision on the idea that it was difficult to argue that Green didn't know right 
from wrong, since, if the deceased had been from the KGB, Green's action would 
have been justifiable. 
However, this does not necessarily discount the possibility that the decisions in 
both cases may be correct, because of the different legislative contexts in which 
they were decided. For instance, arguably the "morally wrong" limb of the insanity 
defence may mean something different in a jurisdiction where unreasonable 
mistake can still found self-defence thtµ1 it would where there is a reasonable belief 
test56 for self-defence. This idea is supported by the fact that the 1942 New Zealand 
case of Murdoch v British Israel Federation inc,
57 which decided that a Green-like 
fact pattern would come within the ambit of the "morally wrong" limb of the 
insanity defence was decided when the self-defence test in New Zealand required a 
reasonable belief It is possible, therefore, that the ambit of the "morally wrong" 
limb of the insanity defence is contingent on other aspects of the law. Thus, just 
because under the reasoning of Oommen
58 a "specific delusions" provision would 
not be relevant in Canada
59 
( due to the fact that the "morally wrong" limb would 
cover such situations), it does not follow that such a provision would also be 
redundant in New Zealand (because the ambit of the "morally wrong" limb does 
not cover such situations). 
53 
The conclusion of the Court involved a comparatively wider interpretation of the ambit of the 
"morally wrong" lin1b. It was held that despite the fact that the accused knew that it was morally 
wrong 
to kill in circumstance (A) and morally right to kill in circumstance (B) he could still come within
 the 
ambit of the "morally wrong" limb. 
54 R v Oommen, above, 20. See also R v Chaulk, above, 236 and }vfurdoch v British Israel Federatio
n 
inc [1942) NZLR 600, 649 (CA) per Smith J. 
55 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
56 
Canada has a reasonable belief test as part of their self-defence law. The case of R v Oommen (1994) 
91 CCC (3d) 8 (SCC) was decided in Canada and therefore this theory could explain that decision
. 
57 Murdoch v British Israel Federation inc [1942] NZLR 600, 649 (CA) per Smith J. 
58 R v Oommen, above, 20. 
59 
Demus R. Klinck "Specific Delusions in the Insanity Defence" (1982-83) 25 Crin1. L.R. 458, 477
. 
• 
From the above-mentioned case analysis, it can be concluded that the decisions of 
Chaulk,60 Walsh,61 and Oommen62 can all be distinguished from Green
63 
either on 
the basis of their facts or legislative context. This suggests that the cause of the 
problem is the law itself.
64 
However, I will now explore whether the reasoning, which went into the decision in 
Green,65 was appropriate (for instance whether its interpretation of the ambit of the 
insanity limbs had a rational foundation) . If it was not appropriate, a change in the 
law may not be necessary. 
C Given New Zealand Legislation, whether Reasoning in the Case of R v Green
66 
was Correct 
1 Morally wrong limb issue 
In order to begin the process of analysing whether the Court in Green
67 
was correct 
in their narrow interpretation of the ambit of the "morally wrong" limb of the 
insanity defence, it is useful to become familiar with how such a provision has been 
judicially interpreted. 
One such case is that of R v Porter68 in which it was noted that an accused would 
come under this limb if he:
69 
[C]ould not think rationally of the reasons which to ordinary people make that act right or 
wrong. If through the disordered condition he could not reason about the matter with a 
moderate degree of sense and composure it may be said that he could not know that what he 
was doing was wrong. 
60 R v Chaulk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC). 
61 Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme Court Tasmania-Court Criminal Appeal A68/1993. 
62 R v Oommen (1994) 91 CCC (3d) 8 (SCC). 
63 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
64 The reason why this suggests that the problem is the law itself is because it seems that the ambit of 
the insanity law in New Zealand simply doesn ' t cover a Green-like fact pattern. 
65 R v Green , above. 
66 R v Green, above. 
67 R v Green, above, 525 McKay J. 
68 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182. 
69 R v Porter, above, 189-190 Dixon J. 
IQ 
• 
Another case that dealt with this issue was Lord Ferrers' trial, 
70 in which Charles 
York as Solicitor General stated that: 
71 
[I]f there be .... a faculty to distinguish the nature of actions; to discern the differenc
e between 
moral good and evil; then, upon the fact of the offence proved, judgement of the law
 must take 
place. 
In order to sufficiently assess whether it was correctly held that Green didn't come 
within this limb of the insanity defence, these historical considerations will be 
supplemented by a framework that recognises when an act of killing is right or 
wrong. 
An act of killing is objectively morally right if the defendants were acting in 
necessary self-defence (or some other legal justification), and morally wrong if they 
were not.72
 For the purposes of this analysis, the former situation will be referred to 
as killing in circumstance (B) and the latter as killing in circumstance (A). 
By applying this framework to the facts of Green 
73 and also to other situations, 
which more clearly fit within the "morally wrong" limb, we can become more 
familiar with the boundaries of this limb, and, consequently, consider whether it 
covers fact patterns like those in that case. 
Each of the above-mentioned cases (see Part IV (B)) involved a defendant who 
killed in circumstance (A). However the distinction between the defendants in the 
Chaulk74 case and the Oommen
75
/ Green76 line of cases lies in their subjective 
perception of the facts / and their general perception of what is right and wrong. 
70 Lord Ferrers ' trial (1760) 19 State Trials 885 (HL). 
71 Lord Ferrers ' trial, above, 947-948. 
72 An example of killing someone for an objectively morally wrong reason would be i
.e if you 
murdered the victim because you didn ' t like him or her. This idea is supported by th
e fact that "morally 
wrong" is understood in New Zealand and Australia to mean 'contrary to the ordina
ry principles of 
reasonable people' [Campbell, I. Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law in Australia 
and New Zealand 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1988) 123.] Thus surely killing someone because you di
dn't like them 
would surely be ' contrary to the ordinary principles of reasonable people; and therefore m
orally wrong. 
73 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
74 R v Chaulk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC). 
75 R v Oommen (1994) 91 CCC (3d) 8 (SCC). 
• 
In Green,77 the defendant believed mistakenly (due to his insane delus
ions) that he 
was killing in circumstance (B) rather than circumstance (A). He also
 knew that it 
was morally wrong to kill in circumstance (A) and acceptable to kill 
in 
circumstance (B). 
This can be compared with the case of Chaulk, 
78 where the defendants knew they 
were killing in circumstance (A) and thought that they were right in k
illing in such 
a situation. 
79 
The significance of this is that Green's act would have been morally 
justifiable if 
the facts were true. This implies the accused is able to think rationall
y of the 
considerations/ reasons which to ordinary people make that act right 
or wrong and 
that they consequently have the faculty
80 to discern the difference between moral 
good and evil. Therefore, Green would not come under the "morally 
wrong" limb 
(he was capable of knowing that the act was morally wrong) of the in
sanity defence 
but would be likely to come within a "specific delusions" provision i
f one existed. 
(This conclusion is still arguably consistent with Oommen
81 coming within the 
"morally wrong" limb due to the different legislative context of the t
wo cases.) 
This can be compared with the defendant in Chaulk, 
82 who, it was rightly decided, 
would come within the ambit of the "morally wrong" limb. This is be
cause he 
thought it was right to kill a "loser. "
83 Therefore, he had neither the faculty nor the 
ability to think rationally about the considerations/ reasons, which to
 ordinary 
people make that act wrong. (For example an ordinary person would
n't think that it 
was right to kill someone because he was a "loser"). 
76 R v Green, above. 
77 R v Green. above, 525. 
78 R v Chaulk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC). 
79 They didn ' t know that it was only morally right to kill someone und
er the narrow circumstances of 
circumstances (B): R v Chaulk, above, 200. 
80 The defendant in the case of Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme C
ourt Tasmania-Court 
Criminal Appeal A68/l 993 17 wouldn ' t have such a faculty as he wa
s in an automatic state at the time 
in which he committed the offence. Therefore he was incapable of kn
owing that the act was morally 
wrong. 
81 R v Oommen (1994) 91 CCC (3d) 8 (SCC). 
82 R v Chaulk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC). 
83 R v Chaulk, above 200. 
It is the knowledge that it is morally wrong to kill someone when not acting for 
instance in self-defence that distinguishes cases, which fit within the "specific 
delusions" provision (like Green84 ) from those that fit within the "morally wrong" 
provision of the insanity defence (like Chaulk
85
). 
This conclusion is in keeping with both the historical interpretations of the "morally 
wrong" limb and the legislative wording of this limb. This suggests two things. 
First, that the Green86 decision (regarding this limb) was correct in light of the law, 
and, secondly, that perhaps the "specific delusions" provision should be reinstated 
to close this gap in the insanity law. 
The idea that a "specific delusions" provision may be needed to close the current 
gap in the insanity law runs counter to the suggestion by a number of legal 
commentators that such a provision involves faulty reasoning. Their argument 
seems to be based, inter alia, upon the idea that to say that it is possible for a 
defendant to be able to know that his act is wrong and simultaneously be so deluded 
that he does not know that it is wrong is a logical absurdity. By this reasoning, a 
"specific delusions" provision would be irrelevant.
87 
However, this argument is incorrect. For example, Green knew that the actual act of 
killing not in self-defence (the circumstance in which he acted) was wrong. 
However simultaneously he (because of his deluded perception of the facts) 
incorrectly thought his act of killing was right (therefore he didn' t know it was 
wrong.) Consequently the reasoning underpinning a "specific delusions" provision 
is not a logical absurdity, and, thus, it should perhaps be reinstated. 
However, before the possibility of such legislative action is explored it is important 
to investigate whether a Green-like situation could in fact fit within the nature and 
quality limb of the New Zealand insanity defence. (If it could then such a provision 
would still be redundant) . 
84 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
85 R v Chaulk, above, 193 . 
86 R v Green, above. 
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2 Nature and quality limb issue 
The judge in Green decided that psychiatric evidence establishing that, as a
 result 
of insane delusions, Green honestly believed that he was acting in self-defe
nce was 
not evidence that he did not understand the nature and quality of his act.
88 
Certain authorities have argued that this approach is questionable/ may be 
doubted.8
9 It has been said that Section 23(2)(a) of the Crimes Act
90 is usually 
considered to comprise two types of lack of understanding. First, it was hel
d in R v 
Cottle91 that it covered a person who did not act consciously. Secondly, a p
erson 
may make a mistake due to an insane delusion which, if it were true, would
 mean 
that his or her conduct would not be an offence. An example often given is where a
 
man cuts the throat of a woman thinking that he is cutting the throat of a pi
g.92 
Authority for this proposition can be found in M 'Naghten 's Case. 
93 
It is arguable that the last point does not apply to all delusional mistakes of fact. 
This idea is supported by comments made in an article written by Dennis R
. 
Klinck. 
94 He agreed that a situation like the above-mentioned pig hypothetical 
(although he used the example of a person killing someone under the mista
ken 
belief that they are hitting a potter' s vessel
95
) came within the ambit of this limb of 
the insanity defence. However, he (like the judge in Green
96
) drew a distinction 
between this scenario and a situation in which the defendant (who believed
 he was 
acting in self-defence) knew that he was hitting a person and that this migh
t cause 
87 Derutis R. Klinck "Specific Delusions in the insanity defence" (1 982-83) 25 
Crim. L.R. 458, 477. 
88 R v Green, above, 524 McKay J. 
89 Robertson Adams on Criminal Law (2 eel, Brooker' s, Wellington, 1998) 71-7
2; Timothy Stephens 
Criminal Law (2 eel, Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 122. 
90 Section 23(2)(a) of the Crimes Act is the subsection, which considers whethe
r the defendant was 
capable of understanding the nature and quality of his act. 
91 R v Cottle [1958] NZLR 999 (CA). 
92 Timothy Stephens Criminal l aw (2 eel, Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 122
. 
93 M'Naghten 's Case (1843) 8 ER 718. 
94 Dennis R. Klinck "Specific Delusions in the Insanity Defence" (1 982-83) 25
 Crim.L.R. 458. 
95 Klinck above 469. 
96 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513, 524 (CA) per McKay J. 
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injury.97 A person with such knowledge would not come
 within the "nature and 
quality" limb of the insanity defence, notwithstanding a m
istake of fact, which 
would have justified her conduct if true. Because Green d
id have such knowledge, 
he understood the nature and quality of his act when he s
hot the police officer. 
Therefore, the reasoning of the judge in Green
98 as to why the case did not come 
within the ambit of the insanity defence was appropriate 
on the law. 
V WHETHER GREEN IS A GOOD DECISION FROM
 A POLICY POINT OF 
VIEW 
AJthough legally correct, the Green
99 decision is problematic from a policy point of 
view. Consequently, steps should be taken to prevent suc
h a result occurring in the 
future . 
This proposition is supported by the fact that it was argua
bly never the intention of 
the legislature (but was instead a legislative accident) to 
exclude a person like 
Green from the ambit of the insanity defence. This sugge
stion is supported by the 
fact that, when the insanity law was altered in 1961 (by r
emoving the "specific 
delusions" provision), the prevailing authority in New Ze
aland concerning a murder 
based upon a deluded (caused by disease of the mind) mi
stake of fact was Murdoch 
v British Israel Federation Jinc.
100 In this case, the judge decided that delusions as 
to factual matters, which if true, would make an act mora
lly justifiable, could 
suffice to show that a person was incapable of knowing t
hat an act is morally 
wrong.1
01 As a consequence of this wide interpretation of the "mora
lly wrong" 
limb, the "specific delusions" provision was no doubt exc
luded from the insanity 
defence as redundant (as opposed to a legislative change 
that was designed to 
narrow the ambit of the insanity defence to exclude a Gre
en-like situation). This is 
because, under this wide interpretation, any person that w
ould come under the 
97 Klinck above 469. 
98 R v Green, above, 524 McKay J. 
99 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
100 Murdoch v British Israel Federation inc [1942] NZLR 60
0 (CA). 
101 Murdoch v British Israel Federation inc, above, 649 Smi
th J. 
"specific delusions" provision (for example like Green) would also come un
der the 
"morally wrong" limb. 
Despite this intention of the legislature., Green-like cases have now been 
unexpectedly pushed out of the ambit of the insanity defence.
102 This has been a 
result of the three-fold interaction of the above-mentioned legislative chang
e, the 
subsequent change (in 1981) to New Zealand's self-defence laws, and, the f
act that 
the judiciary has narrowed their interpretation of the "morally wrong" limb .
 
This legislative accident has resulted in a number of negative policy outcom
es 
which further strengthen the idea that some sort of action should be taken to
 rectify 
it. 
First, a defendant like Green would be able to avoid becoming a special pat
ient by 
pleading self-defence and receiving an unqualified acquittal. Arguably this 
is not 
appropriate, since they may thereby have an easier pathway back into the 
community
103 despite being no less insane than many special patients are. One 
possible solution (which is mentioned in greater detail in Part VI) would be 
to allow 
the prosecution to adduce evidence of insanity when the accused disclaims i
t as a 
defence. 104
 In the case of Green, 
105 it was held that they couldn't, even when the 
defendant was otherwise putting their state of mind at issue. The judges rati
onale 
for this standpoint was that if this resulted in the unqualified acquittal (for e
xample 
on the basis of self-defence) of insane and dangerous people, the provisions
 of Part 
II of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 
could 
be used to secure their treatment.
106 By saying this he was implying that there 
wouldn't be any negative policy outcomes flowing from the possibility of an
 
unqualified acquittal of a person like Green. 
102 R v Green, above. 
103 See Part lil (C)(2). 
104 The Judge under section 113(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 can also
 raise insanity against the 
wishes of the defence. However, until the insanity law is changed (i.e. to 
include a "specific delusions" 
provision) on the reasoning of R v Green [ 1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA) a judge i
n the future would be 
unlikely to use these powers in a Green-like situation. Thus section 113(3
) would not on its own offer a 
solution to this problem. 
105 R v Green, above. 
106 Stanley Yeo Insanity and Automatism (Victoria University of Wellington, 20
00) 5. 
However, for this procedure to be effective in resulting in the same outcome as an 
insanity verdict, it would depend upon such a defendant being committed as a 
restricted patient. If this didn't occur then they would have an easier route back into 
society107 putting both society and the individual (as it makes it less likely that a 
person like Green will get the extent of the help/ rehabilitation that they require) at 
risk. Even if they were to become a restricted patient by being committed 
subsequent to the trial, there would still be a number of negative policy outcomes. 
For example, first, there may be an additional risk to society because of the lay 
period (a few weeks) between the unqualified acquittal (of a defendant like Green) 
and their possible subsequent committal in which such a defendant arguably 
wouldn't be sufficiently secured. This would occur for two main reasons. First, the 
application formalities (section 8 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment 
and Treatment) Act 1992) with respect to committal would have to be completed. 
Secondly the judge would have to examine the patient and there is a possibility that 
there will be a two-week gap between the date of this examination and the receipt 
of the application. 
Second, there would still be a labelling issue because a defendant like Green is 
receiving an unqualified acquittal when they are instead genuinely insane.
108 Such a 
decision goes against the notion that the correct label is appropriate so that the 
criminal law maintains its accuracy.
109 This contravention is very significant in 
light of the fact that the principle of fair labelling is concerned to see that widely 
felt distinctions between kinds of offences and degrees of wrongdoing are respected 
and signalled by the law. Arguably this principle extends to defences as well .
110 
This is because the underlying reasoning behind the principle applies equally to 
defences. 
107 This would also create an incentive for a defendant who conunitted a crime whilst suffering from 
insane delusions to plead self-defence. This incentive will further exacerbate the problems created by 
the state of the law in this area. 
108 He has received an unqualified acquittal in circumstances where arguably an acquittal on the 
grounds of insanity would be more appropriate. (This is because, as has already been mentioned, such a 
defendant is no less insane than a lot of people who would come within the an1bit of the insanity test.) 
109 The ex ante guidance the law is meant to provide requires it to be clearly stated: Sirnester and 
Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (Brooker' s, Wellington, 1998) 30. 
11 0 s· d k 1mester an Broo banks, above, 30. 
The underlying reasoning for the fair labelling principle is two-fold. This is 
illustrated by the fact that it has been argued that it is not satisfactory for the law 
simply to label all convicted offenders unspecifically as "criminals", for that would 
equate the convictions of rapists with pickpockets. This suggests that two main 
ideas underpin the principle. The first is that the fair labelling principle ensures that 
the Criminal law distinguishes between actions that have a disparity in culpability 
between one another. The second is that the labels that the Criminal law gives to its 
elements should reflect the public stigma attached to them.
111 
There is much more public stigma attached to someone acquitted on the grounds of 
insanity than, for example, someone who may have killed whilst acting in self-
defence. Thus one of the underlying reasons for the fair labelling principle applies 
to the distinction between the two defences of self-defence and insanity. Therefore, 
because Green received the wrong label (unqualified acquittal on the grounds of 
self-defence), this contravenes the notion that the correct label should be given to 
elements of the criminal law so that it maintains its accuracy. Another reason why 
correct labelling is important in this context is because the right of appeal that an 
accused like Green would have if they were facing committal independent of the 
Criminal Justice ActH
2is something that they wouldn't have under section 23 of the 
Crimes Act. The result in Green (the label attached to the defendant) is therefore 
inappropriate from a policy perspective in this respect. 
Also if a defendant like Green was acquitted on the grounds of self-defence instead 
of insanity this would (if an application for the defendant to be committed occurred 
independent of the trial) place a heavy onus on the Judge.
113 In such a case arguably 
it should be for the jury (subsequent to the issue of insanity being raised) to 
determine whether Green ' s mental health was sufficiently impaired. 
111 Simester and Brookbanks, above, 30. 
11 2 During the first period of assessment and treatment the proposed patient may apply to have his 
condition reviewed by the Family Court judge under section 16 of the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. This can further delay (thus putting the community at more risk) 
the time period in which the proposed patient is secure in a Hospital: Sylvia.A.Bell (ed) Mental Health 
Law in New Zealand (Brooker' s, Wellington, 1998) 99. 
113 
This heavy onus would flow from the fact that as a result of such an unqualified acquittal it would 
be a judge (in the Family Court) who would have to decide whether i.e. Green' s mental health was 
impaired 
b 
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Therefore, disposition of mentally disordered persons such as Green independent of 
the Criminal Justice Act is arguably undesirable. This idea is supported by the fact 
that the judge in. M'Naghten 's Case
114 (the case upon which the insanity law in 
New Zealand is based (see Part III (A)) noted that a facts pattern like that in 
Green 115 would have come within the ambit of such a "specific delusions" 
provision.116 (Therefore insanity was considered the appropriate result in a case like 
Green) .117 
Therefore, the result in Green
118 is undesirable from a policy perspective. In order 
to analyse the extent of the steps that may be necessary to rectify this problem, it is 
important to investigate whether this situation is limited only to the relationship 
between the insanity and self-defence defences. 
An accused suffering from insane delusions cannot escape the net of insanity by 
pleading any defence of involuntariness, since, they would be putting their state of 
mind and thus their sanity at issue. 
119 The accused would be similarly unsuccessful 
at escaping this net through pleading any other defence (for example 
provocation, 120 compulsion [because there is no real/genuine threat], 
121 or 
necessity 12
2
) other than self-defence, since a delusion is, by definition, an 
unreasonable belief 
11 4 M 'Naghten 's Case (1843) 8 ER 718 (HL). 
115 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
116 " lIJfm1der the influence of his delusion he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to 
take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes in self-defence, he would be exempt from 
punishment": M 'Naghten 's Case , above, 723 Tindal LCJ. 
117 R v Green, above. 
118 R v Green, above. 
119 R v Falconer (1990) ALJR 20, 34. 
120 R v McGregor Ll962j NZLR 1069, at 1075 it is noted that the provocation must be "grave and 
weighty." Thus an accused who commits a crime (due to an imaginary threat) whilst suffering from 
insane delusions wouldn' t be able to rely on this defence because he is merely imagining the 
r:rovocation/ threat. 
21 The terms of the section seem to require an actual threat (R v Teiche/man [1981] 2 NZLR 64, 66-67 
(CA)) . This was accepted inR v Raroa [1987] 2 NZLR 486, 492-493 where the Court of Appeal 
suggested that there can be no defence [ of compulsion] if there were not in fact a threat of the kind 
required by section 24(1) of the Crimes Act even if the accused believed that there was: Robertson 
A dams on Criminal Law (2 ed, Brooker's, Wellinton, 1998) 98-99. 
122 ln the case of Kapi v MOT [1992] 1 NZLR 227, 377 (CA) Judge Jeffries held that the defendant ' s 
perception of the threat must be either correct or reasonably based. 
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This suggests that a person suffering from insane delusions can only hope to escape 
the net of insanity, and thereby become a special patient, if they plead self-defence. 
In light of this finding that the result in Green
123 is undesirable .and limited to the 
relationship between insanity and self-defence, this essay will now explore the 
options/ solutions that could be chosen to reform this relationship between those 
two defences. 
VI REFORMING THE INSANITY/SELF-DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP 
A number of approaches could be taken to reform this relationship between the two 
defences. I will first explore the three least-intervention approaches (procedural 
rather than substantive change), and then move on to possible substantive changes 
to this relationship . 
A Statutory Interpretation 
One possible solution is for the courts to partake in statutory interpretation to help 
close the unintended loophole represented by the decision in Green. 
124 Judges could 
essentially narrow the interpretation of the self-defence law, or widen the 
interpretation of what comes under the insanity law (for instance following the 
Chaulk, 125 Oommen, 126 and Murdoch
127 approach with respect to the amfot of the 
"morally wrong" limb). It is important to note that the issue of whether the court 
can rectify a legislative mistake in this way depends substantially on what sort of 
mistake it is. If both the nature of the mistake and the correction needed to remedy 
it are obvious, the courts will generally remedy this type of mistake. 
128 
123 R v Green ll993] 2 NZLR 513 (-CA) . 
124 R v Green, above. 
125 R v Chaulk (1990)-62 CCC (3d) l-93 . 
126 R v Oommen (1994) 9I CCC (3d) 8 (SCC}. 
127 Murdoch v British Israel Federation {1942} NZLR 600 (CA). 
128 
Jim Evans Statutory Interpretation: Problems of Communication (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1988) 133. 
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An argument in favor of using such an interpretation to widen the ambit of the 
"morally wrong" limb is that this would result in a person like Green coming within 
the ambit of the insanity defence, consistent with the legislative intention.
129 Such 
interpretation would merely be correcting a legislative accident. It would not, in 
effect, be writing a law which Parliament did not intend. 
This approach to statutory interpretation is widely known as the purposive 
approach. The distinguishing feature of strong purposivism is that, when a specific 
statutory text produces "an unreasonable [result] plainly at variance with the policy 
of the legislation as a whole," judges may (and must) alter even the clearest 
statutory text to serve the statute's "purpose."
130 
Another option for the judiciary is to construe the self-defence provision of the 
Crimes Act narrowly. There are two conflicting issues. The first is that self-defence 
is defined in that way, and, unless the law is altered, there may not be any way to 
do this. The second involves the Courts deriving an outcome through statutory 
interpretation, which is best from the perspective of public safety (for example that 
a person like Green is detained as a Special Patient). However, addressing the 
second issue in this way introduces problems with respect to the integrity of the 
Criminal law, because it is important that the courts don't unduly stretch (by 
widening their interpretation of what comes under the insanity law)/ or narrow 
(self-defence) the meaning of bits of the Crimes Act to provide the best result. 
Arguably, therefore, this legislative mistake is too big an error to be dealt with 
through statutory interpretation. This idea is supported by the fact that the failure to 
think through the consequences of the combination of the legislative changes to the 
two defences has meant that the rule enacted is simply an inept instrument to 
achieve the legislative purpose. Therefore, there is little that the Courts can do 
about it. 131 
129 Sec Part V. 
130 
John F. Manning "Textualism and the Equity of the Statute" (2001) 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10-11. 
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B Evidence issue: Should the Prosecution/ Crown be able to raise Insanity 
Another possible procedural solution to the Green problem is to allow the Crown to 
raise the insanity defence (in a case such as Green), notwithstanding that the 
defence didn't raise it. 
If the prosecution/ Crown were able to do this upon the accused pleading self-
defence, there is a good chance that the jury would act on gut instinct and find the 
accused insane. This happened in the Green decision in the High Court, where the 
jury (no doubt heavily influenced by the Crown's evidence concerning insanity) 
found him not guilty by reason of insanity. This would mean that the law might not 
need to be changed and statutory interpretation will not need to be employed. 
The argument that the Crown should be able to raise insanity in these circumstances 
flows from the suggestion in certain case law
132 that, whenever an accused seeks 
acquittal because of his or her state of mind, there is a true exception to the rule that 
the prosecution may not seek to prove insanity. In such an instance the prosecution 
will be permitted to call evidence that the true nature of an accused's state of mind 
was insanity .
133 This practice is illustrated by the English case of R v Kemp, 
134 in 
which it was held that medical evidence of insanity could be called by the 
prosecution in rebuttal of the defence's claim that the accused was acting in a state 
of non-insane automatism at the time of the alleged crime. 
135 
However, looking at the decision in Green, 
136 it now appears that in New Zealand 
the prosecution is not permitted to adduce evidence of insanity even if the accused 
13 1 Jim Evans Statutory Interpretation: Problems of Communication (Oxford University P
ress, 
Auckland, 1988) 233. 
132 Brattyv. A-G.for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, 4ll-412;RvSimpson (1977) 77 D
LR (3d) 507, 
528 (Ont CA); R v Bastian [1958] 1 WLR 413 ; R v Russell [1964] 2 QB 596. 
133 Robertson Adams on Criminal Law (2 ed, Brooker' s, Wellington, 1998) 79. 
134 R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399. 
135 Marc E. Schiffer Mental Disorder and the Criminal Trial Process (Butterworths & Co
, Toronto, 
1978) 141. 
136 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 . 
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has sought acquittal because of some state of mind not amounting to insanity (for 
example self-defence based on a mistaken belief caused by a disease of the 
· d) 137 mm . 
This decision was arguably incorrect with respect to this state of mind issue. The 
rationale behind such an exception to the general rule is that it is not in the public 
interest to allow a mental condition to support an unqualified acquittal when in 
truth that mental condition amounted to insanity.138 Arguably, this same 
justification would occur when an accused raised self-defence (which can result in 
an unqualified acquittal) based on a mistaken belief caused by, for example, 
paranoid schizophrenia (a mental condition).139 
Thus, provided that there are sufficient grounds to have a rule that the Crown can 
adduce evidence of insanity when the accused puts their state of mind at issue this 
may be an appropriate vehicle to use to improve the chances of an insanity verdict 
resulting in a Green-like case. 
The issue of whether such an exception could be justified on policy grounds was 
explored in the English case of R v Dickie140 and the Canadian case of R v 
Simpson.141 
In the decision in Dickie 142 (which was followed by the court in Green, 143) it was 
held that it could never be proper for the Crown to lead evidence of insanity. That 
matter should be left to the defence, or, in exceptional circumstances, to the judge. 
This perspective was based on two interrelated ideas. The first was that allowing 
the Crown to raise this issue would, inter alia, countenance too great an interference 
with the fundamental right of an accused to advance whichever defences they 
137 Robertson Adams on Criminal Law (2 ed, Brooker' s, Wellington, 1998) 79. 
138 R v Cottle (1958] NZLR 999, 1013 (CA). 
139 
Robertson, above, 79. However, it is important to note that perhaps not all self-defence claims will 
involve an accused putting their state of mind at issue but arguably this one did. 
140 R v Dickie (1984] 3 All ER 173 (CA). 
141 R v Simpson (1977) 77 DLR (3d) 507 (Ont CA). 
142 R v Dickie, above. 
143 
R v Green (1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
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consider to be in their best interests. The second was that such an allowance could 
completely distort the trial process.
144 
These two ideas reflect, inter alia, the concern that the prosecution clearly ought not 
to be entitled to bolster a weak case that the accused committed the act by weak 
evidence that the accused was insane when the admission of such evidence might 
deprive the accused of a fair trial by leaving the jury to conclude that he was the 
type of person likely to have committed the act charged.
145 
The Court in R v Simpson
146 took an alternative judicial position. They believed that 
the Crown should be able to raise the issue of insanity in certain circumstances. 
Their reasoning was that an insane defendant lacked the capacity to commit the 
offence. Therefore, a rule, which permitted strong evidence of insanity to be 
withheld from the court at the option of the accused, and led to the conviction of a 
person who lacked capacity to commit the offence, would be very problematic. 
Such a result does not accord with the requirements of justice. It is also 
fundamentally wrong and in conflict with the basic principles of a criminal law 
which, in general, predicates liability upon fault.
147 However, a point to note is that 
we allow people to plead guilty (is this any different?) when they might have a 
defence and not use it, or, the Crown might not have been able to prove the case. 
An effective balance between the policy considerations enunciated in these two 
cases might be to only allow the prosecution to raise the issue of insanity in a 
closely regulated set of circumstances. For example, there would have to be a fairl y 
open and shut case that the accused committed the actus reus of the offence ( and 
therefore the bolstering of a weak case argument would carry little weight) . 
C The Judge raising the Issue of Insanity 
Perhaps a more appropriate option in a Green-like situation is for the judge to put 
the issue of insanity to the jury by utilising their powers under Section 113(3) of the 
144 R v Dickie, above, 178 Walkins L.J . 
145 R v Dickie, above, 178 Walkins L.J. 
146 R v Simpson (1977) 77 DLR (3d) 507 (Ont CA) . 
• 
II 
Criminal Justice Act. However, the likelihood of a judge doing this (in light of the 
judicial interpretation of the ambit of the two limbs of the insanity defence in 
Green
148
) may rest on the reinstatement of a specific delusions provision 149 into the 
insanity laws of New Zealand. This is because the Court will not introduce the issue 
of insanity unless there is "sufficient evidence" of all the requirements of the 
defence. 150 
D Walsh151 Approach 
Another possible solution to addressing the problems caused by a person like Green 
being able to successfully argue self-defence, as opposed to insanity, is the 
approach of the court in the case of Walsh. 152 
This approach was that, after the jury had decided whether the accused is guilty of 
murder or manslaughter, they then had to decide whether they were satisfied on the 
balance of probabilities that the accused was not responsible by reason of insanity. 
Only if the jury were not satisfied that the accused was insane could they consider 
the self-defence issue. Therefore, this approach uses a procedural device to stop a 
result like Green. However there are two arguments against this approach. First, 
arguably it is not consistent with the burden of proof in New Zealand and, second, 
because it goes against the idea that in New Zealand we are moving to make it 
easier to get self-defence to the jury, not harder. 153 
This approach does however have an advantage over that in Green, 154 since the 
insanity issue will come into the picture (because it is explored before the self-
defence issue). In addition, it will exclude facts from the self-defence analysis that 
141 
R v Simpson, above, 509. 
148 
R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513, 524-525 per McKay J. 
149 
In a Green-like situation the judge would have evidence sufficient to come within a specific 
delusions provision [see: M'Naghten 's Case (1843) 8 ER 718, 723 (HL) Tindal LCJ] if such a 
provision was reinstated and thus arguably they would use their powers w1der section 113(3) of the 
Criminal Justice Act. 
150 
Robertson Adams on Criminal Law (2 ed, Brooker's, Wellington, 1998) 78. 151 
Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme Court Tasmania-Court Criminal Appeal A68/1993 . 152 
Walsh v The Queen, above. 
153 
Criminal Law Reform Committee, Report on Self-def ence (1979) 8-10. 154 
R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
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would be included in New Zealand. Prima facie, this approach could go a long way 
to solving the problem with respect to the way the law deals with people in a 
Green-like situation because it makes an insanity verdict much more likely. 
However by itself such an approach may not necessarily result in such a verdict. 
This is because there is an issue as to whether, if a defendant like Green tried to get 
off on self-defence and therefore had to firstly escape the net of the insanity 
defence, the jury would be likely to act on gut instinct and hold him insane or 
follow the narrow interpretation of the insanity defence that the judge in 
Green155took (and thus give him an unqualified acquittal) . 
If the latter is likely to be the case, the "specific delusions" provision may also have 
to be brought back to completely solve the problem illustrated by Green 156 using 
the Walsh 157 approach. 158 
Another alternative with similarities to the Walsh 159 approach is that of the Criminal 
Code Bill Section 7.3 (7) in Australia that provides that: 
[I]f the tribunal of fact is satisfied that a person acted as a result of a delusion caused by mental 
impairment [like the Green case], the delusion cannot otherwise be relied upon as a defence 
[ emphasis added.] 
Although the meaning of this provision is obscure, legal commentators have noted 
that the expression "cannot otherwise be relied on as a defense", would bar the 
situation in a Walsh-like case of delusions being treated as relevant to self-
defence.160 This alternative would, therefore, have the advantage of leaving the self-
defence law otherwise intact. 
155 R v Green, above, 524-525 McKay J. 
156 R v Green, above. 
157 Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme Court Tasmania-Court Criminal Appeal A68/1993. 158 This is because an accused wishing to plead self-defence would have to get through the insanity net 
(which would now be wide enough to include the Green situation by virtue of reinstating the specific 
delusions provision: see M'Naghten 's Case (1843) 8 ER 718, 723 (HL) LCJ) first. 159 
Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme Court Tasmania-Court Criminal Appeal A68/1993. 160 
P.A. Fairall 'The Exculpatory Force of Delusions-A Note on the Insanity Defence" (1994) 6 Bond 
LR 57, 62-63. 
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E Changing the Self-defence Law 
Another possible solution is altering the self-defence law to require a reasonable 
belief This would prevent a person like Green successfully pleading self-defence, 
because a delusional belief is, by definition, an unreasonable belief 
161 Such a law 
would also pay a certain deference to the cardinal principle of criminal 
responsibility that moral obligation is dependent not merely upon the actual facts 
but also upon the actor's perception of them ( a mistaken belief if it is reasonable 
would come within the ambit of the test). 
In support of this law change is the fact that the subjective nature of the first limb of 
the defence of self-defence has caused some concern. This has been illustrated by 
the cases of R v Terewi; 
162 R v Green; 163 R v Thomas.
164 Thus arguably not every 
circumstance of mistaken but honest belief should be encompassed within the ambit 
of self-defence. If so, a law change in this area of the criminal law may be a good 
idea. 165 
However, in order to fully analyse the merits of changing the law in this way, it is 
important to consider the practical implications of such legislative action by 
applying the reasonable belief test to a range of different hypothetical fact 
situations. This idea was explored by Robert F. Schopp, 
166 who looked at the issue 
of whether a reasonable belief test would protect people who had a mistaken but 
reasonable belief, punishing people who made stupid mistakes and not punishing 
them if something were wrong with them (i.e. "reasonable retarded person"/ or they 
may come under the insanity test). 
161 R v Oonm1en (1994) 91 CCC (3d) 8, 18 (SCC). 
162 R v Terewi (1985) 1 CRNZ 623 (CA). 
163 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
164 R v Thomas (Sharon) [1995] Crim LR 314. 
165 Stanley Yeo Insanity and Automatism (Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 5. 
166 
Robert F. Schopp (ed) "Battered Women Syndrome, fa.µ:rt Testimony, and the Distinction between 
Justification and Excuse" (1994) U. I 11. L. Rev. 45. 
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First, defendants may form unreasonable beliefs because they fail to exercise 
appropriate care. A racist defendant, for example, who sees an individual of another 
race approaching with a cricket bat, might honestly but mistakenly believe that he is 
in danger. If this defendant shot and wounded the approaching person without 
exercising the care necessary to notice that he was close to a sports field and that 
many people on the street were carrying bats, one might reasonably conclude that 
he ought to be held liable. It is arguably a negative aspect of the honest belief test 
that it covers such a situation. In cases of this type, a standard requiring reasonable 
belief for self-defence might seem appropriate to many observers.
167 
Second, defendants may form a belief regarding necessity when information is 
limited or distorted. Suppose, for example that a plumber walking home from work 
is confronted in the dark by an apparent armed robber. When the person says, "your 
money or your life," the plumber strikes the apparent robber with a wrench. It later 
emerges that the apparent robber was a retarded person playing a game with a toy 
gun. This is a case of mistaken but reasonable belief.
168 
Third, a defendant might form an unreasonable belief about the necessity for 
defensive force due to impaired capacity (i.e. they are retarded) or disease of mind. 
In contrast to the racist defendant in the first case, this defendant fails to derive a 
reasonable belief due to lack of competence rather than inadequate care. Some 
readers may conclude that this retarded defendant ought to be held to the standard 
of an ordinary person. These readers would endorse conviction of the defendant. 
They would find satisfactory self-defence provisions requiring reasonable beliefs. 
Those who find this conclusion intuitively unjust might consider several strategies. 
First, there is the approach of the Crimes Act, which requires only an honest belief 
rather than a reasonable belief. This approach, however, also exculpates the racist 
defendant in the first case. Many readers may think that different treatment would 
be justified. 169 
167 Schopp (ed), above, 97-100. 
168 Schopp (ed), above, 99-101. 
169 Schopp (ed), above, 100. 
I 
Second, some might argue that the defendant's limited intelligence should be 
relevant to the reasonableness of his belief (they may still fall within the ambit of a 
reasonable person test, even if acting under an unreasonable belief). Jurors would 
then decide whether the belief was reasonable for a person of such limited 
intellectual endowment, applying the standard of the reasonable retarded person. 
This notion is difficult to explicate because limited mental capacity directly 
undermines the capacity to reason with ordinary speed and accuracy, apparently 
generating the notion of the "reasonable person with impaired reasoning." Such an 
interpretation renders the reasonable person standard incoherent under both the 
ordinary and the legal meaning of "reasonable" as grounded in good reasons and 
good reasoning. Although the suggestion that one might formulate standards for the 
"reasonable retarded person" seems implausible, courts and commentators have 
seriously advocated standards for the "reasonable battered woman." 170 
The example of the retarded defendant seems to raise serious concerns about the 
reasonable belief standard. It inculpates such a person despite the fact that he 
formed unreasonable beliefs due to impaired capacities (thus his belief is 
understandable and non-culpable [compare with the bigot]). A possible strategy for 
exculpating such defendants might be an insanity defence. Such a defence could be 
pleaded on the grounds that the defendant did the act whilst laboring under natural 
imbecility 171which rendered them incapable to the extent of coming within section 
23 of the Crimes Act. In other words, due to functional impairment of 
psychological processes, they did not know that their conduct was wrong. Thus, 
one could plausibly argue for inclusion of such a defendant under the provisions of 
the insanity law.172 
By reinstating a reasonable belief test, the plumber would be able to rely on self-
defence but the bigot would not. The retarded defendant would be exculpated 
(under either the insanity laws or by applying a reasonable retarded person 
standard.) Therefore, within the framework of these three examples, prima facie, 
170 S chopp ( ed), above, l 00. 
171 
Natural imbecility refers to cases in which insanity arises from congenital mental subnormality or 
intellectual handicap. 
172 Schopp (ed), above, 102. 
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such a test would still result in the correct outcome regarding exculpation/ 
inculpation. 
However, this approach may create new problems because of the narrow 
interpretation of the existing insanity laws in New Zealand (as illustrated by the 
Court in Green. 173) This interpretation may mean that Green would not come within 
the ambit of either of the self-defence or insanity provisions. Therefore, an 
essentially insane accused like Green may be found guilty and sent to jail. This is 
undesirable for two reasons. First, it would be more beneficial for such an accused 
to receive psychiatric care in a mental institution (which would provide him better 
with the type of help he needs) . However, there is still a chance that such a 
defendant would be committed under section 45 of the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment) Act and thus still receive at least the type (if perhaps not the extent
174
) 
of help he requires for his rehabilitation. However, notwithstanding this possibility, 
a guilty verdict would still be problematic in that it would run counter to the idea 
that a person like Green should not be held morally responsible for their actions. (It 
would instead be much fairer for them to be able to avoid the stigma of 
conviction.)175 However, it is important to note that this negative outcome may not 
eventuate because an accused in Green' s situation might plead insanity if self-
defence were not an option. In any event, the judge would still have the power to 
leave the issue of insanity to the jury.
176 
F Including a "Specific Delusions" Provision in Section 23 
Thus, a number of issues (both positive and negative) would be created by altering 
only the self-defence legislation. This essay will now investigate the alternative ( or 
173 R v Green (1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
174 Such a defendant may not receive the extent of the help that they require for their rehabilitation if 
they don' t become a restricted patient/ or a "special patient." 
175 Roderick Mulgan Psychiatry, Law, and the Insanity Defence (Victoria University of Wellington, 
1999). 
176 The judge might do this by using their powers under section 113(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 
1985. 
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perhaps even complementary) solution of reinstating the "specific delusions" 
prov1s1on. 
l As an alternative (changing insanity/ not changing self-defence) 
As mentioned in Part IV, a situation like that in Green, 
177 
while not covered by the 
"morally wrong" limb of the insanity defence, would be covered by a "specific 
delusions" provision if one existed.178 Thus, if section 23 were revised to include 
such a provision, an opportunity would be created for a situation like the Green fact 
pattern to satisfy both defences. If the defence in such a situation didn't raise 
insanity, then, arguably, the judge would do so by their powers under sl 13 (3) of 
the Criminal Justice Act. This would both resolve the "evidence issue" and mean 
that the jury would have to decide which of the two defences was more appropriate. 
(It is important to note that the judge cannot force the jury to accept insanity Liury 
could still decide insanity is not satisfied and self-defence is]) . This raises a 
possible need to change both defences. 
2 As a complement (changing both defences) 
By changing both the self-defence (to a reasonable belief test) and insanity laws (to 
include a "specific delusions" provision) the jury would not have to make a 
decision between the two defences, the "evidence issue" would be resolved, and the 
negative outcomes that would flow from changing only the self-defence laws (see 
Part VI (E)) would be eliminated . 
177 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
178 This idea is supported by comments made by Lord Chief Justice Tindal in Jvl'Naghten 's Case (1843) 
8 ER 718, 723 (HL) who said: " [IJf under the influence of his delusion he supposes another man to be 
in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes in self-defence, he 
would be exempt from punishment." 
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3 The merits of a "specific delusions,. provision 
This suggests that reinstating the specific delusions provision may be a good idea in 
theory. It would, at the very least, increase the likelihood of a verdict of insanity in 
a Green-like situation. However, a number of issues would need to be explored 
before such a legislative reform could be encouraged: first, the idea that specific 
delusions can't exist and, secondly, that even if they can exist, such a provision 
would nonetheless be redundant [this second issue was covered in depth in Part IV 
(C)L 
Numerous legal commentators have explored this issue of whether a "specific 
delusions" provision should form part of the insanity defence. To many of them it is 
simply incorrect to say that a person affiicted with specific delusions is "in other 
respects sane."179 Such a delusion, they believe, is merely the superficial indication 
of a deep-seated and widespread disorder." 180 
A counter argument is that the law is less concerned with psychological accuracy 
than with fixing principles of criminal liability. Moreover, there is a recognised 
psychiatric condition- "monosymptomatic psychosis" - manifesting precisely the 
syndrome alluded to in "specific delusions" provisions (the patient's delusional 
system is circumscribed and he is able to function normally apart from the 
delusions.) 181 
Another criticism is that the strict application of a "specific delusions" provision 
yields inconsistent results when the delusions are not qualitatively different. 182 
Schiffer illustrated this point in the context of three situations, involving defendants 
who suffered from grandiose delusions of similar proportion. 183 These hypothetical 
examples were, if (A) supposes (delusionally): that Parliament has given him an 
179 The idea that a person may be sane in every respect except for a specific delusion has been 
described as faculty psychology at its worst : Simester and Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law 
(Brooker' s, Wellington, 1998) 289. 
18° Charles Mercier Criminal Responsibility (New York, 1926) 149; This idea was also recognised in 
the case of R v Monkhouse [1923] GLR 13. 
181 Dennis R.Klinck "Specific Delusions in the Insanity Defence" (1982-83) 25 Crim.L.R. 458, 463. 
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II 
unqualified licence to kill; or that God had ordered him to kill; or that he was the 
Angel of Death he would again have a defence. 
In the first and third (because the criminal law of Canada binds men, not angels) 
hypothetical examples, the defendant would have a defence under a "specific 
delusions" provision, but not under the second hypothetical. On this basis, Schiffer 
concluded that such a provision was flawed because not all of them would come 
under the "specific delusion" provision. However, this neglects to take into account 
that the hypothetical example that he gave would not come under this provision. 
Rather it would still come under the "morally wrong" limb of the insanity defence 
(see Part IV). Therefore, the result in all three cases is appropriate since each comes 
within the ambit of the insanity defence. 
Another criticism of the "specific delusions" provision was identified by Glanville 
Williams. He suggested that such a test would lead to trials in which the "facts" 
would consist entirely of the contents of the delusion. These could be elicited only 
by probing the mind of the insane person, an exercise that would doubtless be 
tinged with unreality ("Only an exceptionally clear-headed lunatic would be able to 
furnish all [the] details of his delusion.")1
84 
Another criticism was enunciated in a leading text on forensic medicine, which 
referred to the, "frank absurdity of evaluating insane delusions as if they were 
true. "185 
Arguably, however, the most important criticism of the "specific delusions" 
provision is that it covers situations already comprehended by the other two limbs 
of the insanity defence. This was the perspective of the Court in the case of 
Chaulk, 186 which argued that such a provision was redundant. However, as I have 
already concluded (see Parts IV and V), the narrow interpretation in New Zealand 
182 Marc E. Schiffer Mental Disorder and the Criminal Trial Process (Butterworths & Co, Toronto, 
1978) 137-138. 
183 Schiffer, above, 137-1 38. 
184 Glanville Williams Criminal Law: The General Part (2 ed, Stevens, London, 1961) 501-502. 
185 Brent Fisse Howard 's Criminal Law (The Law Book Company Limited, Sydney, 1990) 462. 
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of the ambit of the morally wrong limb (as illustrated by Green
187
) has meant that 
such a provision would have an application independent of the other two limbs of 
the insanity defence. 
VII CONCLUSION 
At the moment the legal position in New Zealand (as illustrated by Green
188
) is that 
a person suffering from insane delusions can use (the defence of) self-defence 
against imaginary threats and obtain an unqualified acquittal. 
Arguably, it would be more appropriate for such a defendant to become a special 
patient pursuant to section 115(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 for the best 
interests of both society and the individual to be protected. 
Although a defendant in a case like Green189 would likely be committed 
independent of the trial and may become a restricted patient
190 this process is by no 
means certain 191 (relies on a number of discretionary decisions) . And, even if it 
were certain, there would still be the problems flowing from the labelling issue, 
putting too much emphasis on the judge instead of the jury, the time period between 
an unqualified acquittal and committal in a Green-like case, and the issue with 
respect to rights of appeal. 
This essay has explored a number of possible solutions to these problems. One such 
solution is that (because Green has put his state of mind at issue) the prosecution 
could be permitted to call evidence of insanity if a fact pattern such as that in 
186 R v Chaulk (1990) 62 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC). 
187 R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
188 R v Green, above. 
189 R v Green, above. 
190 A restricted patient goes through the same procedure as a "special patient" would have to go 
through in order to be released: Sylvia.A.Bell (ed) Mental Health Law in New Zealand (Brooker's, 
Wellington, 1998) 65. 
191 This poses a problem because a person like Green should become either a special patient or a 
restricted patient to properly protect society and the individual concerned from the potential for 
recurrences of such action. 
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Green192 was being tried, on the basis that it is not in the public interest to allow an 
unqualified acquittal in such circumstances.193 This solution would also have the 
added advantage (over alternative solutions like changing the self-defence test) of 
not requiring legislative change. 
An alternative solution would be to reinstate the specific delusions provision. This 
would mean, inter alia, that even if the defence of insanity were not raised by the 
accused, the judge would be likely to use their powers under section 113(3) of the 
Criminal Justice Act to raise the question of insanity. However, this would not 
necessarily on its own prevent a person like Green from escaping the net of 
insanity. This is because this would enable such an accused to satisfy both defences 
(self-defence and insanity) and possibly plead self-defence successfully. Therefore, 
the Walsh 194 method (or the idea embodied in section 7.3 (7) of the Criminal Code 
Bill in Australia) might, in conjunction with changing the insanity laws, be the 
correct approach. 
By altering the procedural and substantive parts of the law with respect to the 
defences of insanity and self-defence in this way a person like Green would be 
acquitted on the grounds of insanity. This would be a far more appropriate outcome 
from a policy perspective than the result in Green. 195 
192 
R v Green [1993] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
193 R v Cottle [1958] NZLR 999, 1013 (CA). 
194 
Walsh v The Queen (19 August 1993) Supreme Court Tasmania-Court Criminal Appeal A68/1993. 
195 R v Green, above. 
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